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I. INTRODUCTION
Under the American legal regime, criminal sanctions may
only be imposed where expressly allowed by law. However, there
are gaps in the law. Circumstances often arise which are not
covered by criminal statute, but merit some level of punishment.
Consider this scenario: a seventy-seven year old patient suffering
from advanced Alzheimer’s disease is placed in a nursing home
after being hospitalized with pneumonia. 1 “The patient is
bedridden, incontinent, and his limbs [are] contracted.” 2 Upon his
admission, the nursing home staff observes a very large, dark red
area around his buttocks that is identified as a Stage I or II
bedsore. 3 The staff fails to take the appropriate action to treat the
sore and, as a result, the condition worsens to a Stage III bedsore,
which broke open after eleven days. 4 The patient is finally
removed from the care facility and hospitalized. By the time a
doctor examines the patient, the bedsore has deteriorated to Stage
IV, which means that the man’s bones are exposed. 5 The patient
files suit, alleging that the caregivers were grossly negligent in
their failure to properly treat the bedsore. 6 The caregivers’ grossly
negligent conduct is unlikely to result in criminal sanction. It falls
within a gap in the legal regime; a gray area in which punishment
1. See Convalescent Services, Inc. v. Schultz, 921 S.W.2d 731, 733–34
(Tex. App. 14th. Dist. 1996) (This factual hypothetical was taken from a case
heard by a Texas court, in which the court held the defendants grossly
negligent).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id. (when a bedsore has progressed to this point, the skin breaks open
and the sore becomes an open wound).
5. Id.
6. Id.
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and deterrence is merited, but not provided for by law. Allowing
the recovery of punitive damages for grossly negligent behavior
allows for courts to fill these gaps in the law.
The concept of gross negligence is a highly malleable, illdefined legal concept that falls somewhere on a scale between
negligent and intentional conduct. 7 It is generally defined as
conduct that can be considered more blameworthy than simple
negligence, but less blameworthy than intent. 8 While it’s generally
accepted that gross negligence, willful, wanton and reckless
conduct is an aggravated form of negligence, courts and scholars
have had difficulty giving any firm definition to the concept. 9
Prosser and Keeton have discussed gross negligence, and the
difficulties associated therewith, at length. According to them, the
terms “willful, wanton and reckless” have been applied to that
degree of fault which lies “between intent to do harm . . . and the
mere reasonable risk of harm involved in ordinary negligence”: 10
They apply to conduct, which is still merely negligent
rather than actually intended to do harm, but which is so far
from a proper state of mind that it is treated in many
respects as if harm was intended . . . . The usual meaning
assigned to [these terms] . . . is that the actor has
intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character in
disregard of a known or obvious risk that was so great as to
make it highly probable that harm would follow, and which
thus is usually accompanied by a conscious indifference to
the consequences. 11
7. FRANK L. M ARAIST & T HOMAS C. G ALLIGAN, J R., LOUISIANA T ORT
LAW § 1.06 (2d ed., LexisNexis 2009).
8. Id.
9. P ROSSER & KEETON, ON THE LAW O F T ORTS 209–11 (5th ed., W.
Page Keeton et all. eds., West 1984) (Some scholars have tried to place gross
negligence, willful, wanton, and reckless conduct at separate points on the scale
of negligence and create a scheme in which each term describes a different form
of conduct with varying degrees of liability. However, because this is such an
unworkable scheme, most courts and scholars consider these phrases
synonymous; all describing the same general type of conduct that can be
considered more blameworthy than simple negligence, but less blameworthy
than intent).
10. Id. at 212.
11. Id. at 212-13.
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Louisiana courts have joined the collective cry and lamented
the lack of clarity surrounding gross negligence. 12 In Rosenblath’s,
Inc. v. Bakers Industries, Inc., the Louisiana Second Circuit Court
of Appeals sought to distill a workable definition of gross
negligence. 13 The court discussed a number of Louisiana statutes
that provide varying definitions of gross negligence. 14 From its
statutory consideration the court concluded that the legislature
intended to define gross negligence as a reckless disregard, or
carless indifference, which may involve a gross or substantial
deviation from an expected standard of care. 15 The court then
moved on to judicial interpretations that yielded an even more
muddled definition than that distilled from statute. 16 From previous
interpretations, the court found that gross negligence falls
generally between negligence and intent. 17 The court went on to
conclude that Louisiana, through statutes and jurisprudence,
generally defines gross negligence as conduct that falls below what
is expected of a reasonably careful person under like
circumstances, or less diligence than even a careless man is
accustomed to exercise. 18
Both the Louisiana bijural system and the majority of common
law jurisdictions have arrived at a working theory of gross
negligence as an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
care, which even a careless man would exercise, with complete
disregard for the consequences of those actions. 19 Although their
definitions are similar, Louisiana’s application of the gross
negligence standard is remarkably different from that applied in
12. Rosenblath’s, Inc. v. Baker Industries, Inc., 634 So. 2d 969, 972 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1994).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 973 (The court went further to say that gross negligence is a
reckless disregard or careless indifference and may involve a gross or substantial
deviation from an expected or defined standard of care).
19. See id. at 972–3; KEETON, supra note 9, at 211–12.
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her sister states. The common law employs gross negligence in a
more aggressive fashion, allowing its use as an offensive weapon
to create greater liability and allow recovery of punitive
damages. 20 In Louisiana, gross negligence is primarily used in the
context of the defense of immunity, when legislation promotes
public policy by limiting liability for certain actors.
This article focuses on the traditional areas of development of
gross negligence in tort law (immunities, contributory negligence,
and punitive damages) 21 and compares the practical application of
the concept in Louisiana with its application in other common law
jurisdictions. Although in many respects gross negligence operates
in the same fashion regardless of the jurisdiction, there is one
major point of distinction: Louisiana has chosen to limit the
offensive utility of gross negligence by severely curtailing the
availability of punitive damages. In so doing, Louisiana has chosen
to focus on the use of gross negligence in the context of
immunities, in order to raise the threshold of liability for certain
actors.
Section II of this essay considers the historical development of
gross negligence and its arrival into American and, more
specifically, Louisiana law. Sections III and IV consider the
application of gross negligence, in both common law jurisdictions
and in Louisiana. Finally, after an examination of the distinctions
in application in Louisiana and other common law jurisdictions,
this essay argues that Louisiana should incorporate the common
law application of gross negligence and punitive damages into its
legal system to fill the gap between criminal and civil law.
20. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 491-93 (2008). Nebraska
does not apply punitive damages under any circumstances. Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Washington, and New Hampshire only allow recovery of
punitive damage under certain limited circumstances prescribed by statute.
21. This essay focuses on the use of gross negligence in its traditional areas
of tort development: immunities, punitive damages, and contributory
negligence. Gross negligence is also applied to other areas of the law including
contractual indemnity and workers compensation; however, these applications
will not be addressed here.
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II. LOOKING BACK: THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF GROSS
NEGLIGENCE
The concept of varying degrees of negligence has its origin in
Roman law. 22 Under the Roman scheme, there were three levels of
negligence: culpa lata, gross negligence; culpa levis, ordinary
negligence; and culpa levissima, slight negligence. 23 Although
gross negligence in the common law and in Louisiana both trace
their roots back to this original Roman concept, the theory made its
way into each system through very different routes. 24
A. Bringing Gross Negligence into American Jurisprudence
Gross negligence made its way into American jurisprudence by
way of the English writ system 25 from which the modern American
common law developed. 26 Under the writ system, tort law
developed on a case-by-case basis, as the need arose. Gross
negligence entered the English common law in 1704 in Coggs v.
Bernard. 27 Chief Justice Hold of the Kings Bench saw the need to
establish varying degrees of fault in dealing with bailment cases.28
To establish this system, he looked to the Roman tradition and
adopted its concepts of gross negligence, ordinary negligence, and
slight negligence. 29
American jurisprudence adopted the Coggs approach in 1822
with Tracy v. Wood. 30 Justice Story adopted gross negligence in

22. Patrick H. Martin, The BP Spill and the Meaning of “Gross
Negligence or Willful Misconduct”, 71 LA. L. REV. 957, 977–78 (2011).
23. Id.
24. See W ILLIAM E. CRAWFORD, 12 LOUISIANA C IVIL LAW T REATISE :
T ORT LAW 2–3 (2d ed., West 2009); Martin, supra note 22, at 977–78.
25. On the writ system, see EDGAR BODENHEIMER ET AL., AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: READINGS AND
CASES 26 (4th ed., West 2004).
26. Id.
27. (1703) 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (K.B); 2 Ld. Raym. 909.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
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Tracy as a means of limiting the liability for gratuitous bailees.31
Since Tracy, the American judiciary has developed gross
negligence in relation to three different areas of tort law: punitive
damages, contributory negligence, and immunity statutes. 32 Under
the modern common law approach, gross negligence can be used
to justify an award of punitive damages, to overcome contributory
negligence as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery, and to limit the
liability of certain actors with legislative immunity statutes.
B. The Louisiana Perspective
Louisiana’s civilian tort theory traces its origins directly to
Roman law through the laws of France and the laws of Spain,
applicable during the colonial period. The civil law notion of
obligation is derived from Roman law, which defined an obligation
as a vinculum juris, or bond of law, which obliges a person to do or
to refrain from doing something. 33 The Roman law of delict was
based on a simple overarching principle: “A man must see that he
does not willfully invade another’s right, or in breach of a duty,
willfully or carelessly cause him pecuniary loss. If he does either
of these things, he is answerable in damages.” 34 It was under this
Roman theory of tort law that separate levels of negligence first
developed. 35
Roman law found its way into Louisiana through French and
Spanish laws. 36 Antoine Crozat was granted a charter to develop
Louisiana in the name of France in 1712. 37 The charter provided
that the Coutume de Paris, along with all Royal Ordinances and
31. Tracy v. Wood, 24 F. Cas. 117 (C.C.D.R.I. 1822).
32. See Martin, supra note 22, at 992-1014.
33. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 2.
34. Id. at 5 (this principle found its way into many modern civil codes,
including the Louisiana Civil Code).
35. Martin, supra note 21, at 977–978. See also, discussion supra Part
I.A (In Roman law, there were three levels of negligence: culpa lata (gross
negligence), culpa levis (ordinary negligence), and culpa levissima (slight
negligence)).
36. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 10-11.
37. Id. at 8.
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Edicts, would govern the territory. 38 This form of French law
remained in effect until 1769, when Louisiana came under Spanish
rule. 39 The transition from French to Spanish rule meant that, at
least theoretically, Roman law, as received in Spain and codified in
Las Siete Partidas, governed the Louisiana territory until 1808. 40
In 1808, the legislature of the Territory of Orleans tasked James
Brown and Louis Moreau-Lislet with collecting and codifying the
civil laws of the Territory, as Spanish law had been maintained
after the Louisiana Purchase. 41 Moreau-Lislet and Brown produced
the Digest of 1808, which the Legislative Council adopted on
March 31, 1808. 42 There has been a great deal of debate over
whether the Digest of 1808 was based on the Code Napoléon of
France or Las Siete Partidas of Spain. 43 Regardless of which
source the Digest of 1808 more closely resembles, both the Code
Napoléon and Las Siete Partidas find their roots in the Roman
tradition.
Under modern civilian theory, legislation is the law and is to be
treated as the solemn will of the legislature. 44 Judicial opinion is
nothing more than the interpretation of the law. 45 However,
because the code articles governing delicts are very limited,
Louisiana courts have been forced to write the majority of tort law
under the guise of interpretation. 46 Louisiana courts have thus
developed the state’s modern tort law, including the concept of
38. Id.
39. Id. at 10.
40. Id. at 7, 10.
41. Id. at 10-11.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2 (2010) (“Legislation is a solemn expression
of legislative will”).
45. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 (2010) (“The sources of law are legislation
and custom”).
46. Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 530 So. 2d 1151, 1156 (La. 1988) (“The
framers conceived of fault as a breach of a preexisting obligation, for which the
law orders reparation, when it causes damage to another, and they left it to the
court to determine in each case the existence of an anterior obligation which
would make an act constitute fault”).
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gross negligence. Like the common law, Louisiana adopted gross
negligence from the Roman law and then developed the concept
through jurisprudence, focusing on punitive damages, contributory
negligence, and immunity statutes, just as in the common law
states.
III. GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN THE COMMON LAW
After the adoption of gross negligence into American
jurisprudence in 1822, the judiciary began to develop the concept
in the context of punitive damages, contributory fault, and
immunity statutes. 47 Punitive damages are employed to punish
certain behavior just as immunities are employed by the legislature
to promote certain behavior. 48 On the one hand, a plaintiff is
allowed to recover punitive damages upon a showing of gross
negligence while on the other, legislatures use gross negligence as
a limit to the defense of immunity, allowing the plaintiff to recover
when establishing that the defendant has been grossly negligent.
A. Gross Negligence and Punitive Damages in the American
Common Law
The idea of punishment as a civil mechanism can be traced
back to a number of ancient legal systems, including the Twelve
Tables—the original codification of ancient Roman law. 49 The
English common law adopted the concept of extra damages to
punish reprehensible conduct in the 1763 case of Wilkes v. Wood. 50
In Wilkes, the court granted an award for “more than the injury
received” against the Secretary of State for conducting an unlawful

47. See Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
48. See BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996) (The
Supreme Court recognized that states have a legitimate interest in protecting
their citizens from extra blameworthy behavior and affirmed the use of punitive
damages to punish the actor and deter future conduct of a similar nature).
49. John W. deGravelles, J. Neale deGravelles, Louisiana Punitive
Damages—A Conflict of Traditions, 70 LA. L. REV. 579, 580 (2010).
50. Id. at 581.

224

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

search of the plaintiff’s papers. 51 Afterwards, the English courts
began to routinely grant awards in excess of a plaintiff’s actual
damages when the defendant’s actions merited punishment. 52
In 1784, punitive damages crossed the Atlantic and entered
American case law in Genay v. Norris. 53 Since the adoption of
punitive damages into American law, the Supreme Court has
evaluated the appropriate use of the concept. In BMW of North
America v. Gore, the Court observed that some wrongs are more
blameworthy than others. 54 The Court affirmed that states have a
legitimate interest in protecting their citizens from extraordinarily
blameworthy behavior by allowing punitive damages, which the
Justices reasoned would serve to punish the actor and function as a
deterrent of future behavior of a similar nature. 55 In a later
decision, the Court was forced to address exactly what type of
conduct was worthy of civil punishment. 56 The Court determined
that punitive damages should only be used to punish a defendant
who was guilty of outrageous conduct, and affirmed the traditional
notion that gross negligence was the threshold for punitive
damages liability. 57 Many states have chosen to follow the
Supreme Court’s example. 58 Nevertheless, the availability of
punitive damages varies on a state-by-state basis. 59 This being
said, most states will allow the plaintiff to recover punitive
damages upon a showing of gross negligence. 60 In fact, this
application has become so entrenched in the American judicial
51. (1763) 98 Eng. Rep. 489, (K.B.) 498.
52. Huckle v. Money, (1763) 95 Eng. Rep. 768, (K.B.) 768-69.
53. Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 557 U.S. 404, 410 (2009) (citing
Genay v. Norris, 1 S. C. L. 6, 7, 1784 WL 26 (C. P. and Gen. Sess. (1784)).
54. 517 U.S. 559, 575–76 (1996).
55. See id. at 569.
56. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 493 (2008).
57. Id.
58. See id. at 492–94.
59. Id. at 494. (Nebraska does not apply punitive damages under any
circumstances. Louisiana, Massachusetts, Washington, and New Hampshire
only allow recovery of punitive damage under certain limited circumstances
prescribed by statute).
60. Martin, supra note 22, at 994.
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mind that the Seventh Circuit has speculated that the primary
function of gross negligence is to justify an award of punitive
damages. 61
Georgia and New York are representative of the common law
approach to punitive damages and gross negligence. 62 Georgia
employs a statutory regime that governs the application of gross
negligence and punitive damages, 63 while in contrast, punitive
damages in New York are governed exclusively by case law. 64 A
consideration of the application of gross negligence to punitive
damages in Georgia and New York is illustrative of the broader
common law approach.
1. Punitive Damages under Georgia Law
The availability of punitive damages in Georgia is governed by
statute. State law allows the recovery of punitive damages where
the plaintiff can establish that the defendant’s actions showed
“willful misconduct, malice, fraud, wantonness, oppression, or that
entire want of care which would raise the presumption of a
conscious indifference to consequences.” 65 Under Georgia law,
punitive damages are primarily used to deter similar conduct in the
future by punishing a guilty actor in the present. 66 If the court finds
a defendant to be merely negligent, then damages are limited to the
amount necessary to make the plaintiff whole. 67 Punitive damages

61. Kelly v. Malott, 135 F. 74 (7th Cir. 1905).
62. Both Georgia and New York set the minimum threshold for punitive
damages at gross negligence.
63. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5(a) (LexisNexis 2011); Kicklighter v. Nails by
Jannee, Inc., 616 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. See Welch v. Mr. Christmas, Inc., 440 N.E.2d 1317 (1982).
65. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b) (LexisNexis 2011).
66. WMH, Inc. v. Thomas, 398 S.E.2d 196, 198 (Ga. 1990) (the court
insisted that the primary goal of punitive damages is deterrence, and a jury
award which had the sole purpose of punishing wrongful behavior cannot be
upheld).
67. Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp., 193 S.E.2d 629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App.
1972).
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are only recoverable when the defendant’s conduct is worthy of
deterrence. 68
Under this standard, a Georgia court awarded punitive damages
in Comcast Corporation et al. v. Warren. 69 The plaintiff in this
case sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident when the
defendant’s employees failed to properly warn of an obstruction
they had created in the roadway. 70 After coming to an immediate
stop to avoid the obstruction, Mr. Warren was struck in the rear by
another vehicle. 71 The jury awarded Mr. Warren $280,000 in
compensatory damages and $720,000 in punitive damages. 72 The
trial court subsequently reduced the award of punitive damages to
$250,000, to bring the award amount within the appropriate
statutory guidelines. 73 On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered the scenario and determined that the employees of
Comcast had behaved “negligently, recklessly, wantonly, and with
a conscious disregard for the consequences” of their actions in
their failure to warn of the obstruction they had created. 74 If the
court had determined that the defendants were merely negligent,
the plaintiffs would have been limited to compensatory damages. 75
But, because the court concluded that the defendants were grossly
negligent, punitive damages were appropriate. 76
2. Punitive Damages under New York Law
In contrast to Georgia, punitive damages in New York are
governed primarily by case law. Under the New York standard,
punitive damages are to be employed to punish the defendant for
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
1972).
76.

Id.
650 S.E.2d 307 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007).
Id. at 309.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 312–13.
Molton v. Commercial Credit Corp., 193 S.E.2d 629, 633 (Ga. Ct. App.
Id.
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his conduct and to deter similar future behavior. 77 To sustain a
claim for punitive damages, the plaintiff must show that his or her
damages were the result of “intentional or deliberate wrongdoing,
aggravating or outrageous circumstances, a fraudulent or evil
motive, or a conscious act that willfully and wantonly disregards
the rights of others.” 78 If the plaintiff can establish one of these
aggravating factors, punitive damages may be awarded. 79
Under this standard, the Supreme Court of New York’s Kings
County upheld an award of punitive damages in Hall v.
Consolidated Edison Corporation. 80 In Hall, Consolidated Edison
employees entered a building on a Friday afternoon under the
pretense of being elevator repairmen. 81 Once inside, the employees
shut off electrical service to the common hallways and elevators of
the apartment building, which held over 500 tenants. 82 The
plaintiff, attempting to care for elderly and bedridden patients,
slipped on wax drippings in a darkened stairway and sustained
injuries from a fall. 83 The jury returned a verdict of gross
negligence and awarded punitive damages in the amount of
$5,000,000. 84 On appeal the court upheld the lower court’s finding
of gross negligence and the award of punitive damages, but
reduced the amount of damages awarded by the jury. 85
3. A Final Look at Punitive Damages
In the end, punitive damages are only awarded when the
actions of the defendant go far beyond the pale of reasonable
conduct. In 2005, punitive damages were only pled in an estimated
77. Le Mistral, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 402 N.Y.S.2d 815, 817 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1978).
78. Don Buchwald & Assocs. v. Rich, 723 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001).
79. See Le Mistral, Inc., 402 N.Y.S.2d at 817–18.
80. Hall v. Consol. Edison Corp., 428 N.Y.S.2d 837 (N.Y. 1980).
81. Id. at 842.
82. Id. at 838.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 838–39.
85. Id. at 842–43.
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twelve percent of state court trials nationwide, 86 and awarded in
only five percent of all cases where the plaintiff won. 87 As these
statistics indicate, courts reserve punitive damage awards for the
limited circumstances where punishment is merited and deterrence
is necessary. 88 Most states consider gross negligence as meriting
punishment. In the majority of common law states, just as in New
York and Georgia, grossly negligent behavior will give the
plaintiff an opportunity to pursue an award of punitive damages.
B. Contributory Negligence in the Common Law
A second historical application of gross negligence has been in
the realm of contributory negligence. 89 Under the theory of
contributory negligence, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff,
which contributes to his injuries, bars the plaintiff from recovery. 90
Many courts were dissatisfied with the traditional contributory
negligence rule, but were unable to abolish it without stepping into
the shoes of the legislature. 91 Instead, the courts developed gross
negligence as a means of overcoming contributory negligence as a
bar to the plaintiff’s recovery. 92 Courts concluded that wherever it
appeared that the plaintiff’s negligence was comparatively slight
and the defendant was guilty of gross negligence, the plaintiff
should not be denied recovery. 93
Recognizing the harsh nature of contributory negligence, most
states have moved toward some form of comparative fault. 94 Under
86. Thomas H. Cohen & Kyle Harbacek, U.S. Department of Justice,
Special Report: Punitive Damage Awards in State Courts, 2005 (March
2011), available at http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/gpo35184/pdasc05.pdf.
87. Id. at 4.
88. BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (U.S. 1996).
89. Martin, supra note 22, at 1002.
90. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 (Cal. 1975).
91. Martin, supra note 22, at 1002.
92. Comment, Negligence: Exceptions to the Rule that Contributory
Negligence Is a Defense: Gross Negligence, 17 CAL. L. REV . 65, 66 (1928).
93. Id.
94. North Carolina’s Contributory Negligence Rules Outdated and Unfair,
Disabled World (August 13, 2010), www.disabledworld.com/news/america/nc
/negligence-laws.php (last visited Jul. 30, 2013).
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a pure comparative fault scheme, liability is apportioned according
to fault. 95 For example, if the plaintiff is ninety percent at fault and
the defendant only ten percent, the plaintiff is still entitled to
recover ten percent of his damages from the defendant. 96 In
contrast, under an ordinary comparative fault scheme, liability is
apportioned up to the point at which the plaintiff’s fault is greater
than or equal to that of the defendant’s. 97 Under an ordinary
comparative fault scheme, the plaintiff is entitled to recover for his
or her damages up until the point at which he or she is forty-nine
percent at fault, and the defendant fifty-one percent at fault. 98 If it
reaches the point where the plaintiff is fifty percent or more at
fault, recovery is barred. 99 Thirteen states have a pure comparative
fault scheme and thirty-three states have chosen to follow an
ordinary comparative fault scheme. 100 Only four have chosen to
continue applying contributory negligence. 101
The decline of contributory negligence has lessened the need
for courts to use gross negligence as a means of awarding damages
despite a plaintiff’s negligence. However, in the few jurisdictions
that continue to apply the doctrine of contributory negligence,
gross negligence can still be used to circumvent a bar to recovery.
For example, under North Carolina law, contributory negligence
still serves as a bar to recovery and gross negligence is still used as
a means of overcoming it. 102
C. Immunity Statutes in the Common Law

95. Li v. Yellow Cab Co. of Cal., 532 P.2d 1226, 1242–43 (Cal. 1975).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. North Carolina’s Contributory Negligence Rules Outdated and Unfair,
supra note 96.
101. Id.
102. Yancey v. Lea, 550 S.E.2d 155, 157 (N.C. 2001) (The court accepted
the jury’s finding that negligence on the part of both the plaintiff and defendant
were a cause of the plaintiff’s injuries and denied the plaintiff’s recovery on the
grounds of contributory fault).

230

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 6

A third significant source of development of gross negligence
has been its use in conjunction with immunity statutes. 103 Many
scholars believe the use of gross negligence to overcome immunity
statutes is best seen as an “escape route” that allows a court to
avoid the absurd results that could be reached with unqualified
immunity. 104 Professor Fredrick Schauer proposed that:
Legal systems must provide some escape route from the
occasional absurdity generated by literal application
because applying the literal meaning of a rule can at times
produce a result which is plainly silly, clearly at odds with
the purpose behind the regulation, or clearly inconsistent
with any conception of wise policy. 105
Using gross negligence in conjunction with immunity statutes
provides a heightened threshold of liability for a defendant;
however, it also allows courts the option of permitting the plaintiff
to recover when the defendant’s actions are of such a nature that to
deny damages would be absurd. 106
Traditionally, legislatures have granted broad immunity to
actors whose conduct is considered valuable to society. 107 These
statutes are enacted under the theory that, while the defendant may
be a wrongdoer, there is greater social utility derived from
protecting him than in making an injured plaintiff whole. 108
Therefore, when legislatures view an actor’s activity as beneficial
to society, they may wish to protect that actor by limiting his or her
liability in tort action. 109
Immunity statutes provide an affirmative defense to certain
tortious conduct. 110 Most states do not provide unqualified
immunity for privileged actors. 111 Rather, they raise the threshold
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Martin, supra note 22, at 1006.
Id. at 1007.
Fredrick Schauer, Formalism, 97 Yale L.J. 509, 525 (1988).
Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 9, at 1032.
Id.
Martin, supra note 22, at 1007.
Id.
Id.
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of their liability from negligence to gross negligence. 112 Plaintiffs
have to prove that the otherwise-immune defendants were grossly
negligent for recovery to be available.
Although there is some variation from state to state, almost all
common law jurisdictions employ governmental immunity
statutes, automotive guest statutes, recreational activity statutes,
and Good Samaritan legislation. 113 The recreational land use
statute is one of the most common immunity statutes in effect. 114 It
encourages landowners to open their property for public
recreational use, free of charge, by limiting the owner’s liability for
accidents that occur on the property. 115
Georgia’s recreational land use law illustrates how common
law immunity statutes operate to promote the governmental goal of
encouraging certain behavior by limiting an actor’s liability for
injuries that may occur on the property. 116 Under Georgia law, a
land owner generally owes no duty to keep his or her property safe
for recreational users; 117 however, the owner will be liable for
injuries if he or she was grossly negligent in failing to warn or
guard against a dangerous condition, use, or activity. 118
A Georgia court addressed the state’s recreational use laws in
Spivey v. City of Baxley. 119 The plaintiff brought suit for injuries
sustained while attending a softball game at a field maintained by
the County Recreation Board. 120 Mrs. Spivey alleged that she fell
after stepping from a concrete slab covering a drainage ditch. 121
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See The University of Vermont, Recreational Use Statues,
http://asci.uvm.edu/equine/law/recreate/recreate.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2011).
115. Id.
116. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-20 (LexisNexis 2011) (Georgia takes a
traditional, middle-of-the-road view of gross negligence. The way the state’s
legal regime employs the concept in punitive damages and immunity statutes is
representative of how other common law jurisdictions treat gross negligence.).
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-22 (LexisNexis 2011).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-3-25 (LexisNexis 2011).
119. 437 S.E.2d 623 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id. at 624.
121. Id.
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She maintained that her injuries were a result of the defendant’s
failure to correct a dangerous condition existing on the property.122
In answer to Mrs. Spivey’s claims, the defendant asserted its
immunity under Georgia’s recreational land use statute. 123
The court recognized that, under Georgia law, a defendant who
allows free access to the property can only be held liable if the
plaintiff established that the defendant’s actions showed a “willful
failure to guard or warn.” 124 The court stated that for the defendant
to be found grossly negligent, he or she must have knowledge that
a condition which posed an unreasonable risk of death or serious
bodily harm existed, that the condition was not apparent to those
using the property, and that the owner chose not to guard or warn
against the danger in disregard of the consequences. 125
The Spivey court considered that, while Georgia’s recreation
land use statute did not expressly include spectators at athletic
events, the purpose of the statute clearly encompassed this sort of
use; therefore, the recreational land use statute was applicable. 126
The court concluded that the defendant was not guilty of grossly
negligent conduct and could not be held liable. 127
As the Georgia land use statute illustrates, immunity statutes
operate as an affirmative defense by allowing a negligent plaintiff
to escape liability. Had a state immunity statute not covered the
landowner in Spivey, it would have been liable to the plaintiff for
negligently failing to warn of the obstruction. However, because
the immunity statute was in play, the landowner was able to plead
as a defense that, because he was not grossly negligent, he could
not be held liable.
Immunity statutes are employed by the legislature to encourage
certain behavior just as punitive damages are awarded to
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

Id.
Id. at 625.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 625–26.
Id. at 626.
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discourage certain behavior. Immunities raise the threshold of
liability from negligence to gross negligence. If an immunity
statute covers the defendant, he or she will escape liability if the
plaintiff is unable to prove that the defendant was grossly
negligent. This applies in Louisiana in the same manner as in
common law states.
IV. THE LOUISIANA APPROACH TO GROSS NEGLIGENCE
Like the common law, Louisiana’s law of gross negligence
traces its origins to the Roman legal system. 128 Similarly, the
framework of Louisiana’s gross negligence law was generally
developed in the context of punitive damages, contributory
negligence, and immunity statutes. 129 However, the end result
differs slightly from that of common law jurisdictions. Unlike
common law jurisdictions, Louisiana has chosen to severely curtail
the use of gross negligence in the context of punitive damages.
However, it is still very much alive within the state in the context
of immunities.
A. Gross Negligence and Punitive Damages in Louisiana
Prior to 1917, Louisiana took an approach to punitive damage
that was identical to that of common law jurisdictions. 130 Courts
allowed recovery upon a showing of gross negligence, even though
early versions of the Louisiana Civil Code contained no punitive
damages provisions. 131 Louisiana courts acknowledged the conflict
between the state’s civilian heritage, which did not recognize
punitive damages, and this approach. 132 In Dirmeyer v. O’Hern,
the Louisiana Supreme Court observed that punitive damages were

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

See discussion, supra Part II.B.
Id.
deGravelles, supra note 49, at 584–85.
Id.
Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887).
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borrowed from the common law 133 and that Louisiana’s practice of
granting this form of recovery was against the long-standing rule in
civilian jurisdictions that the purpose of awarding damages was to
repair the harm sustained by the victim, not to punish the conduct
of the wrongdoer. 134 In 1917, the Louisiana Supreme Court sought
to rectify this discrepancy in Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana.135
The court held that pecuniary penalties intended to punish the
tortfeasor would no longer be recoverable in Louisiana unless
expressly allowed by statute. 136
As a result of the Vincent decision, modern Louisiana law only
allows recovery of punitive damages where expressly authorized
by statute. 137 The statutory basis for punitive damages can be
found in the Civil Code, which provides instances where
“exemplary” damages may be recoverable. 138 The code allows
recovery of exemplary damages for child pornography, intoxicated
driving, and criminal sexual activity occurring during childhood.139
Using the words “exemplary damages,” these Code articles allow
recovery of punitive damages upon a showing that the damages
were caused by a “wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and
safety of others,” 140 or gross negligence. If a plaintiff’s claim does
not fall within one of these narrowly defined categories, punitive
damages are unavailable, regardless of the depravity of the
defendant’s conduct.

133. Id.
134. deGravelles, supra note 49, at 580.
135. 74 So. 541 (La. 1917).
136. See id. at 548.
137. See id. at 548-49.
138. See LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE. ANN. art.
2315.4 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.7 (2010) (The legislature set forth
three codal provisions outlining circumstances in which punitive or exemplary
damages may be awarded: 1) Article 2315.3, additional damages for child
pornography; 2) Article 2315.4, additional damages for intoxicated defendant;
and 3) Article 2315.7, liability for damages caused by criminal sexual activity
occurring when the victim was 17 years old or younger).
139. Id.
140. See id.
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In Mosing v. Domas, a Louisiana court addressed the purpose
of punitive damages in Louisiana: “[Punitive damages] . . . are
given to the plaintiff over and above full compensation for his
injuries, for the purpose of punishing the defendant, of teaching the
defendant not to do it again, and of deterring others from following
the defendant’s example.” 141
Following this line of reasoning, the Louisiana legislature
enacted a limited set of laws detailing under what circumstances
the defendant’s actions are sufficiently blameworthy to merit
punitive damages. 142 Each of Louisiana’s punitive damage
provisions makes a textual reference to gross negligence; however,
courts have moved away from requiring the plaintiff to make an
actual showing of gross negligence. 143 Instead, courts often
presume that the defendant was grossly negligent if the plaintiff
can establish certain facts and causation. 144
1. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.4

141. Mosing v. Dumas, 798 So. 2d 1105, 1113 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2001)
(citing Rivera v. United Gas Pipeline Co., 697 So. 2d 327 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1997)).
142. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2315.4 (2010); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 2315.7 (2010).
143. See Bourgeois v. State Farm, 562 So. 2d 1177, 1182 (La. Ct. App. 4th
Cir. 1990) (“Several courts have . . . indicated that a presumption of recklessness
can be made when the intoxication of the defendant is the cause in fact of the
accident”); Myres v. Nunsett, 511 So. 2d 1287, 1289 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir.
1987):
A number of other states take the position that operating a motor
vehicle on the public road after voluntary intoxication in and of itself
constitutes sufficient reckless disregard to warrant an award of
exemplary damages. Our codal article requires an additional showing
that the accident resulting in injury was caused by the voluntary
intoxication of a defendant;
McDaniel v. DeJean, 556 So. 2d 1336, 1340 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 1990) (“[The
defendant] acted with a wanton or reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others by getting intoxicated and driving . . . . We find the evidence
preponderates that his intoxication was a cause in fact of the accident; therefore,
the exemplary damage award was proper”).
144. See Bourgeois, 562 So. 2d at 1182 (a defendant’s gross negligence will
be presumed upon a showing that the defendant was intoxicated and that his
intoxication was a cause in fact of the plaintiffs’ injuries).
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.4 allows a plaintiff to
recover punitive damages upon showing that his injuries were
caused by the defendant’s gross negligence in operating a vehicle
while intoxicated. 145 The text of the article requires that the
plaintiff prove the defendant was grossly negligent; however, in
Bourgeois v. State Farm, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit stated that
some Louisiana courts would presume recklessness upon a
showing that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s
intoxication. 146
After consideration of the statutory requirements of 2315.4, the
Bourgeois court broke the article down into the three elements that
a plaintiff must establish in order to recover punitive damages. 147
These elements are: 1) that the defendant was intoxicated or had a
“sufficient quantity of intoxicants to make him lose normal control
of his mental and physical facilities;” 2) that the drinking was a
cause in fact of the accident; and 3) that the injuries were caused
by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others. 148 The court focused on the third element necessary for
recovery—proof that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the
defendant’s grossly negligent conduct. 149 The court noted that
many Louisiana courts employ a presumption of gross negligence
if the intoxication of the defendant was a cause in fact of the
plaintiff’s injuries. 150 The court concluded that, while the Fourth
Circuit generally required a separate showing of wanton and
reckless disregard, most Louisiana courts would assume gross

145. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4 (2010):
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
others by a defendant whose intoxication while operating a motor
vehicle was a cause in fact of the resulting injuries.
146. Bourgeois, 562 So. 2d at 1179–80.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1180.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1182.

2013]

FILLING THE GAPS

237

negligence upon a showing that the defendant’s intoxication was to
blame for the plaintiff’s injuries. 151
Following Bourgeois, the circuit courts split on what a plaintiff
was required to prove to recover punitive damages under article
2315.4. 152 Some circuits maintained that a plaintiff was required to
establish not only that the defendant was intoxicated and his
intoxication was a cause in fact of his injuries, but also that the
injuries were caused by the defendant’s wanton and reckless
disregard for the safety of others. Other circuits believed that by
proving that the defendant was intoxicated and his intoxication was
the cause in fact of the injuries, the plaintiff had satisfied his
burden. By taking the latter approach, courts have removed the
burden on the plaintiff that required him to prove the defendant
was grossly negligent when seeking punitive damages. The award
of punitive damages is not truly predicated upon gross negligence
in circumstances where there is obviously voluntary intoxication.
2. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.7
The legislature enacted Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.7 to
provide for damages suffered as a result of criminal sexual activity
occurring while the victim was a minor and for “related
matters.” 153 Article 2315.7 allows for an award of punitive
damages upon a showing that the plaintiff’s injuries were caused
by a “wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety” of
the plaintiff through criminal sexual conduct, which occurred
while the plaintiff was seventeen years old or younger. 154

151. Id. at 1184.
152. deGravelles, supra note 49, at 595.
153. 1993 La. Acts no. 831.
154. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.7 (2010):
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
the person through criminal sexual activity which occurred when the
victim was seventeen years old or younger, regardless of whether the
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Louisiana state courts have had limited opportunity to interpret
and apply article 2315.7. However, a federal court in Louisiana
applied the article in Capdeboscq v. Francis. 155 In Capdeboscq, the
plaintiffs alleged that they had voluntarily posed topless for a
photo after the defendants assured them that they would not appear
in a Girls Gone Wild video. 156 The plaintiffs complained that, even
after they were assured they “had nothing to worry about,” they
were featured on the cover of Girls Gone Wild: Doggy Style. 157
The plaintiffs sought punitive damages under article 2315.7.158
The court, however, found that the plaintiffs had failed to state a
basis upon which their claim could be predicated. 159 The court held
that, because the plaintiffs had failed to allege a violation of an
applicable criminal statute, there was no basis for recovery under
article 2315.7. 160 The Capdeboscq court’s brief analysis provides
little guidance on what constitutes gross negligence and grounds
for recovery under the article. 161 However, the court indicated that
violation of a criminal statute dealing with sexual misconduct was
necessary to allow a plaintiff to recover under article 2315.7. 162
If liability is predicated upon violation of a criminal statute,
then recklessness will likely be presumed upon a showing that the
defendant’s conduct violated the applicable criminal law. If this is
true, then the plaintiff will not be required to make a separate
showing of gross negligence to recover punitive damages.
3. Gross Negligence and Louisiana Civil Code Article 2315.3

defendant was prosecuted for his or her acts. The provisions of this
Article shall be applicable only to criminal sexual activity.
155. Capdeboscq v. Francis, CIV.A.03-0556, 2004 WL 463316 (E.D. La.
Mar. 10, 2004).
156. Id. at 1.
157. Id.
158. Capdeboscq v. Francis, CIV.A. 03-0556, 2003 WL 21418499 (E.D. La.
June 16, 2003).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id.
162. See id.
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Louisiana Civil Code article 2315.3 allows for recovery of
punitive damages if the plaintiff can establish that his injuries were
caused by the defendant’s “wanton and reckless disregard . . .
through an act of pornography involving juveniles as defined by
R.S. 18:81.1.” 163 The Louisiana legislature enacted article 2315.3
in 2009 to allow the recovery of punitive damages by victims of
child pornography, even if the person responsible for the damages
was never criminally prosecuted. 164 Louisiana courts have not yet
had occasion to apply article 2315.3. Because the courts have not
addressed punitive damages within the context of the child
pornography article, there is no indication of whether this article
will be interpreted to require a showing of gross negligence or if it
will be presumed upon a showing that the defendant violated the
state’s child pornography statute. 165 However, given the
construction of the article, it seems likely that to constitute wanton
or reckless conduct, the defendant’s actions must, at the very least,
violate the state’s juvenile pornography statute. 166
4. A Final Look at Louisiana’s Law on Gross Negligence and
Punitive Damages 167

163. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (2010):
In addition to general and special damages, exemplary damages may be
awarded upon proof that the injuries on which the action is based were
caused by a wanton and reckless disregard for the rights and safety of
the person through an act of pornography involving juveniles, as
defined by R.S. 14:81.1, regardless of whether the defendant was
prosecuted for his acts.
164. 2009 La. Acts no. 382.
165. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:81.1 (2012).
166. See id.
167. Louisiana also employs the Louisiana’s Drug Dealer Liability Act,
which is the fourth and final punitive damages statute in use. The purpose of the
Louisiana Drug Dealer Liability Act is to provide a civil remedy for damages to
persons in a community injured by an individual’s use of illegal drugs by
establishing a cause of action against drug dealers for monetary, noneconomic,
and physical losses. The idea was to shift the cost of the damage caused by the
marketing of illegal drugs to those who profit from the market, while at the same
time deterring others from entering the market. The act allows certain categories
of persons, injured by an individual’s use of an illegal controlled substance, to
recover punitive damages. The statute allows for any persons injured as a result
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Louisiana has chosen to severely curtail the availability of
punitive damages under state law by restricting their availability to
circumstances in which they are specifically authorized by statute,
all of which require some form of criminal conduct. However, each
provision authorizing punitive damages predicates recovery upon a
finding that the defendant was grossly negligent. In many
instances, the courts have interpreted these articles in such a way
as to relieve the plaintiff of the burden of actually proving that the
defendant was grossly negligent, voluntary criminal conduct
presuming that the action was based on a wanton and reckless
disregard for the victim’s safety or interest. This creates a situation
similar to res ipsa loquitur where the court will presume
negligence even without conclusive proof where justified by the
circumstances. 168
B. Gross Negligence and Contributory Fault in Louisiana
Prior to 1980, Louisiana employed a contributory negligence
scheme 169 similar to that in effect in the common law. 170 Under
this standard, any conduct on the part of the plaintiff that was a
legally contributing factor to his injuries was sufficient to bar
recovery. 171 Louisiana adopted this system in Fleytas v.
Pontchartrain Railroad Co., before there was an organized body of
civilian doctrine on comparative fault. 172 In 1980, the legislature

of the individual user’s gross negligence to recover punitive damages. The
plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their injuries
were caused by the use of illegal drugs; however, no further showing of gross
negligence is necessary for recovery. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.61
(2009); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.63 (2009); Kemp v. Metabolife Int’l.,
Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17770 (E.D. La. 2003).
168. See MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 8.06.
169. See Dumas v. State, 828 So.2d 530, 532-33 (La. 2002).
170. Id. See also discussion supra, Part III.B (on the common law rule of
contributory fault as a bar to a plaintiff’s recovery).
171. Dumas, 828 So. 2d at 533.
172. Id., citing Fleytas v. Pontchartrain R. Co., 18 La. 339 (1841); Bell v. Jet
Wheel Blast, 462 So. 2d 166, 169 (La. 1985).
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amended Louisiana Civil Code article 2323 to replace contributory
negligence with a pure comparative fault scheme. 173 Article 2323
states that:
If a person suffers injury, death, or loss as the result partly
of his own negligence and partly of the fault of another
person or persons, the amount of damages recoverable shall
be reduced in proportion to the degree or percentage of
negligence attributable to the person suffering the injury,
death or loss. 174
The legislature chose to adopt a comparative standard to
mitigate the harshness of the contributory negligence doctrine. 175
Rather than denying recovery outright if the plaintiff contributed to
his injuries at all, the legislature adopted a pure comparative fault
scheme that apportions liability in direct proportion to fault.176
Under this scheme, if the plaintiff is ninety percent at fault in
causing his or her injuries, he or she may still recover ten percent
of the damages, the portion sustained due to the defendant’s
fault. 177 When Louisiana shifted from a contributory negligence to
a comparative fault scheme, the application of the gross negligence
standard within this context was severally curtailed because
plaintiffs were no longer required to overcome contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery.
C. Gross Negligence and Immunities in Louisiana
Immunities represent the predominant use of gross negligence
in Louisiana. As in the common law, immunity statutes are
intended to protect certain actors from liability when the legislature
determines that their conduct is so beneficial to society that the
value of their actions outweighs other societal interests that dictate

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Murray v. Ramada Inns, Inc., 521 So. 2d 1123, 1132 (La. 1988).
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2323 (2010).
Id.
See discussion supra, Part III.B.
See discussion supra, Part III.B.
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tortfeasors should compensate their victims. 178 Louisiana adopted
traditional immunity statutes including: governmental immunity;
automotive guest statutes; recreational activity statutes; and Good
Samaritan legislation. 179 However, Louisiana also has immunity
statutes that reflect its unique culture, including a statute limiting
the liability of Mardi Gras krewes. 180 In all, Louisiana has more
than forty immunity statutes that cover a wide range of actors and
generally raise the level of liability from negligence to gross
negligence. 181
In Louisiana, immunity statutes are an affirmative defense to
be pled by the actor after the tort has occurred. 182 If the actor’s
conduct is covered by the statute, he will escape liability where it
would otherwise be imposed. 183 Louisiana applies immunity
statutes in essentially the same fashion as common law
jurisdictions. 184 The distinction, if any, lies in the actors that
Louisiana chooses to protect and the number of immunities that
have been enacted. 185
The immunity for Mardi Gras krewes is unique to Louisiana. 186
Mardi Gras parades are an important part of Louisiana’s culture
and a major element of the state’s tourism industry. The legislature
recognized the potential liability facing parade participants and

178. MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 11.01; see also discussion supra, Part III.B.
179. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37.
180. Id; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2796 (Supp. 2011).
181. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37.
182. MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 11.01.
183. Id.
184. See discussion supra Part III.C (Common law jurisdictions employ
immunity statutes to protect actors whose conduct is seen as so beneficial to
society that the societal interest in protecting the actor is greater than the societal
interest in having a tortfeasor make his victim whole. Louisiana follows the
same approach. In both the common law and Louisiana, immunities represent an
affirmative defense that often raises the threshold of liability from negligence to
gross negligence and allows an actor to escape liability).
185. See CRAWFORD, supra note 24, at 833–37 (Louisiana has over 40
immunity statutes covering a span of actors from charities and money managers
to Mardi Gras krewes).
186. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2796 (Supp. 2011).
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enacted Louisiana Revised Statute Section 9:2796, which limits the
liability of parade participants to gross negligence. 187
With this plethora of immunity statutes, gross negligence is
very much alive in Louisiana. It allows a plaintiff to override the
defense of immunity when proving the defendant’s gross
negligence.
V. COMPARING GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN LOUISIANA AND THE
COMMON LAW
Gross negligence can be used by plaintiffs to recover punitive
damages and, when necessary, to overcome contributory
negligence as a bar to recovery. It is also used in conjunction with
immunity statutes to limit the scope of the defense to cases of
simple negligence. 188 Louisiana makes a nominal use of gross
negligence in the context of punitive damages, 189 and continues to
employ the concept when dealing with immunities. 190
Louisiana and the common law diverge in the context of
punitive damages. The common law will generally allow recovery
of punitive damages in circumstances where the defendant was
grossly negligent. In Louisiana, if the actor is negligent, the
plaintiff will recover compensatory damages but nothing more, no
matter how egregious the actor’s behavior, unless one of the state’s
limited punitive damages provisions apply, requesting
recklessness, though gross negligence can be presumed as these are
situations of intentional criminal conduct. These divergent
applications can lead to dramatically different results.

187. Id.
188. See supra Part III.C.
189. See supra Part IV.A (Louisiana has limited punitive damage awards to
circumstances expressly outlined by the legislature through statute or code
article. These statutes, as interpreted by the Louisiana judiciary, generally do not
require a true showing of gross negligence. In many circumstances, the requisite
mindset can be presumed upon proof of causation).
190. See supra Part IV.C (discussion of Louisiana’s use of gross negligence
in conjunction with immunity statutes).
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Louisiana’s decision to change from the traditional common
law application of punitive damages was based largely on the
state’s civilian heritage. 191 Punitive damages were, and remain,
largely rejected by the civilian jurisdictions of continental
Europe. 192 The refusal by the German Supreme Court to enforce in
Germany an American court’s decision awarding a juvenile
$400,000 in punitive damages on the basis that it was against
public order is illustrative of the general European perspective. 193
Dr. Koziol discussed the general European distaste for punitive
damages in his 2008 article, Punitive Damages—A European
Perspective. 194 Dr. Koziol’s discussion illuminates a number of the
prevailing arguments against the award of punitive damages. 195
The primary concern is that the private law is neither geared
towards nor equipped to punish actors for their wrongdoing. 196
Rather than stretching private law beyond its intended bounds,
criminal law should be improved to meet any outstanding needs. 197
A number of American scholars have joined in the criticism of
punitive damages. 198 Consider Anthony Sebok’s attack of punitive
191. See, e.g., Dirmeyer v. O’Hern, 3 So. 132, 134 (La. 1887) (Where the
Louisiana Supreme Court recognized the discrepancy between Louisiana’s
approach to the application of punitive damages and traditional Civilian theory);
Vincent v. Morgan’s Louisiana, 74 So. 541 (La. 1917) (where the Louisiana
Supreme Court made the decision to limit the award of punitive damages to
situations where they had been specifically authorized by statute); discussion
supra Part IV.
192. Helmut Koziol, Punitive Damages—A European Perspective, 68 LA. L.
REV. 741, 751 (2008).
193. Id. at 742.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 751–58.
196. Id. at 751–52, 763 (Dr. Koziol argues that the private law fails at
adequately punishing and deterring blameworthy behavior because there is no
corresponding relationship between the injury suffered by the plaintiff and the
amount of recovery. He argues that punishing the defendant with punitive
damages allows a windfall for the plaintiff who has suffered no corresponding
injury. He goes on to say that, if the defendant is going to be held liable for
punitive damages, the only way to justify their award is to place the damages
that go beyond compensation into a public fund in such a way that they amount
more to a fine than extra compensatory damages).
197. Id.
198. Anthony J. Sebok, Punitive Damages: From Myth to Theory, 92 IOWA
L. REV. 957 (2007); Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment
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damages in his article, Punitive Damages: From Myth to
Theory. 199 Professor Sebok concedes that punitive damages must
have some deterrent effects, but argues that they fail as a
mechanism of efficient deterrence because research suggests that
juries produce awards that are neither certain nor likely to bear a
reasonable relationship to the amount of money that incentivizes
investment in appropriate safety measures. 200 Yet another scholar,
Dan B. Dobbs, argues that punitive damages are not subject to
accurate measurement and therefore not subject to effective
limits.201 Professor Dobbs goes on to discuss a number of other
criticisms. 202 In particular he argues that punishment should be
reserved for criminal law and that allowing punitive damages
could lead to an unfair application that may over-deter some
conduct while under-deterring other conduct. 203
While it is true there are a number of arguments against
punitive damages, they do serve an invaluable gap filling function
in American law. Reconsider the factual scenario from the
beginning of this article in which the seventy-seven year old man
was allowed to suffer from an extremely painful condition while
his caregivers took little to no action to alleviate his pain. 204 Under
the American legal regime, the caregivers’ actions fall outside the
scope of criminal law, thus the only available remedy is in tort.
Given the caregivers’ recognition of the condition, their failure to
treat the condition, and their choice to allow the condition to
progress to such a life-threatening level, it seems reasonable to

Problem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87
MINN. L. REV. 583 (2003); Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of
Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425 (2003); Dan B. Dobbs,
Ending Punishment in “Punitive” Damages: Deterrence-Measured Remedies,
40 ALA. L. REV. 831 (1988).
199. Id.
200. Id. at 984.
201. Dobbs, supra note 198, at 834.
202. Id. at 837–39.
203. Id.
204. See supra Part I.
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conclude that the caregivers were grossly negligent. 205 Because the
actors were grossly negligent, the damages awarded to the patient
depend upon the jurisdiction in which the suit is brought. Under
the prevailing common law approach, the caregivers’ grossly
negligent actions would allow the plaintiff to recover punitive
damages. 206 Had this case been brought before a court in
Louisiana, no punitive damages would have been awarded because
the factual scenario is not expressly provided for by the legislature.
Under Louisiana law, the conduct would go undeterred and the
defendants would escape any form of punishment. 207
The caregivers’ behavior was extremely blameworthy. They
recognized that the patient was suffering from a minor bedsore that
could have been easily treated; but rather than following the proper
procedure to treat the condition, they allowed the bedsore to
progress to a serious, life threatening condition. 208 Is it right for
these actors to escape punishment simply because their conduct
falls through a gap between private and criminal law? Is this not
the type of behavior that a state has a legitimate interest in
deterring?
The flexibility afforded by allowing the award of punitive
damages upon a showing of gross negligence is what makes the
common law approach so appealing. Under the common law
system, punitive damages serve as a “gap-filler” that allows for the
punishment and deterrence of blameworthy behavior, without

205. Gross negligence is an extreme departure from the ordinary standard of
care. See supra Part I.
206. See id. This fact pattern was presented to a Texas Appellate Court in
Convalescent Services, Inc. v. Schultz. 921 S.W.2d, 739–40 (Tex. App. 1996)
(the Texas court determined that the caregivers’ actions were grossly negligent
and upheld the trial court’s award of punitive damages).
207. See MARAIST, supra note 7, at § 7.02 (“Compensatory damages are
divided into two broad categories: special and general damages.” Special
damages are those that have a quantifiable value, general damages are those
which are speculative in nature and include pain and suffering, mental anguish,
and loss of enjoyment of life).
208. See Convalescent Services, 921 S.W.2d at 733.
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requiring the legislature to pass specific legislation covering every
conceivable scenario.
The United States Supreme Court has declared that punitive
damages are civil penalties intended to punish actors for
extraordinarily blameworthy behavior and deter similar actions in
the future, and that they are justified by a state’s legitimate interest
in protecting its citizenry from extraordinarily blameworthy
behavior. 209 The Louisiana legislature recognized the value of civil
punishment with its adoption of limited punitive damages statutes.
However, because the legislature must enact a statute specifically
authorizing punitive damages before they can be awarded, many
actors whose behavior should be punished will escape retribution
unless the legislature has expressly provided otherwise.
The benefit of having punitive damages available to punish
grossly negligent conduct is that they provide an extra tool for
courts to employ when the circumstances merit punishment but fall
outside the scope of criminal law. Louisiana should enact
legislation allowing courts to grant punitive damages in case of
gross negligence, similar to most common law sister states. Doing
so places the responsibility of monitoring awards of punitive
damages in the hands of the state’s judiciary, who would be
responsible for gauging the blameworthiness of a defendant’s
behavior and making a determination of whether his conduct is
grossly negligent and merits punishment. Giving courts this ability
would allow for punishment as merited by the circumstances
without forcing the legislature to predict every possible scenario.
VI. CONCLUSION
The common law applies a relatively balanced approach to its
application of gross negligence, both in the context of punitive
damages and immunities. Louisiana has essentially abandoned the
component of gross negligence in the context of punitive damages,
209. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
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but maintains its application in the context of immunities.
Louisiana does not allow punitive damages for a showing of gross
negligence unless specifically authorized by statute, Civil Code
provisions to this effect being limited to cases of intentional
criminal conduct. Louisiana’s approach to gross negligence and
punitive damages leaves a gap between criminal and private law.
By requiring the legislature to pre-legislate punitive damages
recovery, Louisiana has eliminated the flexibility that makes the
common law system so attractive. Allowing courts to impose
punishment for grossly negligent behavior fills the void left
between criminal law and private law. It allows the court to punish,
and thereby deter, egregious behavior as it arises, rather than
requiring the legislature to pass specific statutes governing every
sort of action. It is impossible for the legislature to preconceive
every blameworthy action before it occurs. The common law
approach of allowing the judiciary leeway to assess punitive
damages for grossly negligent behavior insures that blameworthy
behavior is subject to some form of punishment, even if it is
outside the scope of criminal law. Even European opponents to
punitive damages, including Dr. Koziol, have recognized that
European criminal law covers a broader swath of activity than the
American counterpart, 210 and therefore punitive damages may be
necessary to fill voids in the law.
Louisiana is a hybrid jurisdiction that employs a distinct
version of the civil law, like few other legal systems in the world.
This offers an opportunity to administer justice and punish grossly
negligent actors who are guilty of conduct that goes far beyond the
pale of reasonableness, while preventing the miscarriage of justice
associated with grossly disproportionate punitive damage awards.
The legislature could adopt a statutory scheme that allows the
judiciary more freedom in applying punitive damages for grossly
210. Koziol, supra note 192, at 760 (Dr. Koziol points out that, in many
situations, circumstances that would merit punitive damages under American
law are punishable by criminal law in many European systems).
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negligent actions, but which maintains a narrow enough scope to
prevent the miscarriage of justice associated with disproportionate
exemplary damage awards.

